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The Legal Relationship
Between Cohabitants and Their
Partners' Children
Cynthia Grant Bowman*
This Article arguesthat U.S. law shouldgive protectionto relationships
between cohabitantsand theirpartners'children when necessary to
avoid the economic and emotional trauma that may be caused by
separationofthe childfrom a member ofhis or her householdifthe
cohabitationends. After examining the socialscience literatureabout
the welfare of both stepchildren and children ofcohabitantsand the
inadequate legal treatment of custody, visitation,and child support
issues under current law, the author recommends that cohabiting
stepparents (1) be given standingto seek custody if they have acted
as de facto parents, with a presumption in favor of custody by the
stepparent when the cohabitantwho is the child's biologicalparent
has died and the possibility ofjoint custody in other cases; (2) be
awardedvisitation if both the ex-cohabitantand child desire it; and
(3) be obligatedto pay child supportfor the child ifthe cohabitation
dissolves after a periodof two years or more.
INTRODUCTION
The remarkable increase in cohabitation over the last few decades, both in
the United States and in other countries, has created a variety of new family
relationships, not only between the adults involved but also between the adults
and their children. U.S. law has failed to respond to these new circumstances,
which have profound effects for the individuals involved. In this Article, I
focus on just one of those relationships: the relationship between a child
living in the household of a cohabiting couple and the cohabitant who is
in a position analogous to that of a stepparent - the partner of the child's
biological parent. If the cohabitants are of the same sex, this topic has been
*
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extensively explored both in litigation and scholarly literature.' My focus will
therefore be on children living with opposite-sex cohabiting couples, which
has not been the subject of a great deal of discussion. I limit my discussion
here to issues of custody, visitation, and child support, and will address other
issues, such as inheritance and receipt of government benefits, in future work.
Why is this an issue with which family law should be concerned? Perhaps
the easiest way to answer this question is to contemplate what scenarios
occur if the nonbiological children of cohabitants are considered, as they are
now, to be legal strangers to the cohabitant in the position of a stepparent to
them. If the child's biological custodial parent dies, the surviving cohabitant
has little chance of obtaining custody unless he or she works out an informal
agreement with the child's noncustodial biological parent. If the issue is
adjudicated, the child will almost certainly be transferred to the custody of the
other biological parent, perhaps living with a biologically related person who
is truly a stranger, rather than allowed to remain in the household where he or
she has been living. 2 If the cohabiting relationship terminates by dissolution
rather than death, moreover, the child has no legal right to any contact with
a person who may have long been her primary caretaker, the only father she
ever knew, or with children she considers brothers and sisters. If the child has
been living with the mother's cohabiting partner, both mother and child are
likely to have become economically dependent on that partner, and separation
of the adult cohabitants can amount to a sudden and immense economic
disaster for the child.
In Part I below, I discuss the relationship between cohabitants and the
children in their households and the effects that relationship may have upon
the children's welfare. There is a limited amount of information available
on this topic from studies of cohabiting families, but a large social science
literature exists about stepfamilies headed by married couples, about the
relationship between stepparents and stepchildren, and about how children
fare in these families. The residential stepparent-stepchild relationship is the
closest analogy to that between a cohabitant and his or her partner's child,
with one difference: the stepparent has legally enforceable obligations to
the child's parent and the cohabitant does not. I will draw upon the literature
about married stepparents to supplement what we know about cohabitants'
children. After reaching some conclusions about whether this relationship
1

See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005);

NANCY

D.

POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER

85-88 (2008).
Sarah E.C. Malia, Balancing Family Members'InterestsRegarding Stepparent
Rights and Obligations:A SocialPolicy Challenge, 54 FAM. REL. 298, 304 (2005).
THE LAw
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is one of value, I explore in Part II the current treatment in U.S. law of both
married and unmarried stepparent-stepchild relationships and the inadequacy
of this treatment.
Before suggesting appropriate legal rules to govern this situation, I review
in Part III various recommendations that have been made in the literature about
married stepparents, as well as the approaches taken in some other countries.
Finally, I discuss what the legal treatment of cohabitants' relationships with
their "stepchildren" should be. Unlike the approach suggested in my previous
writing,' here I argue that a more nuanced approach may be desirable where
children are involved, one that is sensitive to the diversity of relationships
likely to exist between a cohabitant and a nonbiological child living in his
or her household.

I. WHAT Do WE KNOw ABOUT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

COHABITANTS AND THEIR "STEPCHILDREN"

A. Statistics About Cohabitants with Children in Their Households
Although the census regularly and systematically underestimates the
numbers of cohabitants and their children, 4 it is clear that this new family
form is shared by large and increasing numbers of people in the United
States. The 2000 census reported that there were 4.9 million unmarried-partner
households, and thus at least ten million people living with a person of the

3

I have previously argued that cohabitants should be treated as though they
were married after they have lived together for two years and/or have a child in
common, see CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC

POLICY 224-28 (2010); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and
Legal Policy: The Case ofHeterosexual Cohabitation,9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1,

45-48 (2007).
4

The census counts households rather than couples, so if two unmarried-partner
couples reside in the same household, only one would be counted, or if a son
and his unmarried partner resided with his married parents, only a married
household would be counted, U.S. CENSUs BUREAU, MARRIED-COUPLE AND
UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf. In addition, cohabitants responding to
survey questions do not always understand that "unmarried partner" refers to

their living arrangement, Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring
and Modeling Cohabitation:New Perspectivesfrom Qualitative Data, 67 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 999-1000 (2005) (drawing on 115 in-depth interviews
with young working-class cohabitants).
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opposite sex as an unmarried partner.' The 2010 census indicated that this
number had increased to 7.529 million couples.6
Children live in about forty percent of all cohabiting households.7 By
2009, it was possible to estimate the number of these children at 4,134,000,
or almost six percent of all children in the United States.' About half are the
biological children of both cohabitants, and about half are children of one of
the cohabitants, typically (seventy-five percent) of the woman.' The statistics
differ dramatically by race and ethnic group. One 1996 study reported, for
example, that eight percent of Puerto Rican children, five percent of Mexican
American and Black children, and three percent of non-Hispanic white
children live in cohabiting families.' 0
B. The Impact of Cohabitation on Children in These Households
The fact that a child's parent is a cohabitant has a variety of impacts on a
child's life, both economic and psychological. Because the literature studying
these effects is in its infancy, I supplement it here with insights gleaned from
the voluminous literature about stepfamilies."
First, women and children gain by the addition of a cohabitant's income to
the household, a virtually identical income premium from either cohabitation
or marriage - a gain of roughly fifty-five percent in needs-adjusted total

5
6

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 4, at 1.
Americas Families andLiving Arrangements, 2010, U.S.

CENSus BUREAU,

tbl.

UC 1: Opposite Sex Unmarried Couples by Labor Force Status of Both Partners:
7
8

9

2010, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps20O0.html
(last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
U.S. CENSUs BUREAU, supra note 4, at 10 (compared with forty-six percent of
married-couple households that include children under eighteen).
America's Families andLiving Arrangements, 2009, U.S. CENSUs BUREAU, tbl.
C3: Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years and Marital Status of
Parents, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin and Selected Characteristics
of the Child for All Children: 2009, http://www.census.gov/population/www/
socdemo/hh-fam/cps2009.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
Id. (for 2,120,000 children, the parent is the other partner; for 2,013,000, the

other partner is not the parent).
10
11

Wendy D. Manning & Daniel T. Lichter, ParentalCohabitationandChildren's
Economic Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 998, 1002-03 (1996).
Research published about stepfamilies tripled during the 1990s, Susan L.
Pollet, Still a PatchworkQuilt: A Nationwide Survey of State Law Regarding
StepparentRights and Obligations,48 FAM. CT. REv. 528, 529 (2010) (discussing
the proliferating literature about stepfamilies).
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family income.12 If the cohabiting relationship ends, women cohabitants
lose about one third of their household income, leaving them with levels
of household income similar to that of divorced women." The impact is
particularly severe upon African American and Hispanic women and their
children." Taking the income of cohabitants living in a household into account
makes a dramatic difference in the official poverty statistics. In 2000, for
example, 39.7% of children living with cohabiting couples were reported to
be living in poverty, but this fell to 20.1% if the cohabiting partner's income
was taken into account. '5 In other words, cohabitation substantially reduces
the numbers of children living in poverty. 6'
A serious problem for children living in these households is that cohabiting
unions are less stable than marriages, so the improvement in economic situation
may not be long-lasting. Fifty percent of children living with cohabitants
will experience the dissolution of their parents' relationship by the time
they are five (versus fifteen percent of children of married parents), and two
thirds by the time they are ten." Again, the likelihood of disruption varies by
subgroup, with forty percent of Hispanic and non-Hispanic white children
born to cohabiting couples and sixty percent of comparable African American
children confronting this loss by age five." While some part of the difference
Audrey Light, Gender Differences in the Marriageand CohabitationIncome
Premium, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 263, 279 (2004). One study reports that children of
divorced parents experience an increase of about $6000 in their median adjusted
family income if their custodial parent either remarries or cohabits, Donna
Ruane Morrison & Amy Ritualo, Routes to Children ' EconomicRecovery After
Divorce: Are Cohabitationand RemarriageEquivalent?,65 AM. Soc. REv. 560,
570 (2000).
13 Sarah Avellar & Pamela J. Smock, The Economic Consequences of the
Dissolutionof CohabitingUnions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 314, 324 (2005).
14 Id.
12

15 Daniel T. Lichter, Zhenchao Qian &Martha L. Crowley, ChildPoverty Among
RacialMinorities andImmigrants:Explaining Trends andDifferentials, 86 Soc.
Sci. Q. 1037, 1046-47 (2005).
16 While the addition of a cohabiting stepfather makes a substantial difference
to a child's economic welfare, the addition of a stepmother may not be as
economically beneficial because of the difference in earning capacity between
women and men resulting both from structural discrimination and the division
of child care responsibilities, see Avellar & Smock, supra note 13, at 325.
17 Wendy D. Manning, Pamela J. Smock & Debarun Majumdar, The Relative
Stability of Cohabitingand Marital Unionsfor Children, 23 POPULATION RES.
& POL'Y REV. 135, 136 (2004).
18 Id.; see also Cynthia Osborne, Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock,
Marriedand CohabitingParents'RelationshipStability:A Focus on Race and
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in stability between married and cohabiting couples may be attributable to
economic factors, there may also be effects of family complexity; blended
families can be quite stressful. Second and subsequent marriages, similarly, are
more unstable than first marriages, although not as unstable as cohabitation,
with sixty percent of remarriages ending in divorce.19 Transitions in living
arrangements are emotionally stressful for children.20
Social scientists have only recently turned their attention to studying the
psychological, emotional, and educational effects upon children living in
cohabiting households and comparing them with children living in married
or single-parent households. Many of these studies reach conflicting
conclusions. 2 Moreover, most studies of cohabitants and their children do
not control for the large number of variables other than family form that
may explain these differences. For example, one 2003 study of adolescents
reported that teens living with cohabiting stepparents confront a variety of
disadvantages compared to those living with two biological married parents,
such as higher delinquency scores and lower grades. 2 2 However, most of
these differences were explained by socioeconomic factors like income, race,
ethnicity, and parent's education. 23 Given the inconclusive nature of studies
about cohabitants, I supplement it with what we know about stepfamilies.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1345, 1361 (2007) (finding that children born
to cohabiting versus married parents have a 184% higher risk of their parents'
separating by the time they are three years old).
19 Pollet, supra note 11, at 529. Between fifty-seven percent and seventy-six percent
of cohabiting unions break up within ten years, varying by race, ethnic group,
and employment status, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS

Ethnicity, 69 J.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,

COHABITATION, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA
FROM THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH

17 fig. 17 (2002) (defining breakup

as either of the cohabitation or of a marriage subsequent to cohabitation).
20 See, e.g., Manning, Smock &Majumdar, supranote 17, at 136; Jay D.Teachman,
21

The ChildhoodLiving Arrangements of Children and the Characteristicsof
Their Marriages,25 J. FAM. ISSUES 86, 91 (2004) (and articles cited therein).
See Marion C. Willetts & Nick G. Maroules, ParentalReports ofAdolescent
Well-Being: Does Marital Status Matter?, 43 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 129,

133 (2005) (describing multiple conflicting studies on all these topics).
22

Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well-Being in Cohabiting,
Married,and Single-ParentFamilies,65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 885-86, 888
(2003).

23 Id. at 891. Parental income has been shown to account for fifty percent of
the negative effects of divorce upon children, see Pamela J. Smock & Wendy
D. Manning, Living Together Unmarried in the United States: Demographic
Perspectivesand Implicationsfor FamilyPolicy, 26 LAw & POL'Y 87, 94 (2004).
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Stepfathers are similar to cohabitants in the economic advantage they confer
upon both the new wife and her children; thus similar problems are presented
if stepfamilies dissolve. 24 Studies have also shown that stepchildren do not fare
as well as biological children in a number of ways.25 For example, significantly
less money is invested in the college education of stepchildren. 26 There is
also evidence that stepmothers do not invest as much in their stepchildren as
they do in their own biological children if the stepfamily is a "blended" one. 27
Stepparents are a very disparate group - male and female, residential
and'nonresidential, having their own children either by previous unions or
together.28 The quality of a stepparent-stepchild relationship varies not only
with individual characteristics of the two parties, but also with the age of the
child at the time of the remarriage and the length of time the two have lived
together.29 In other words, the younger a child at the time a stepparent enters his
24

See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law i
Perceptionsof "Family" After Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS

102, 107 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990); Bridget

25

Freisthler et al., It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: Young
Adult Stepchildren Talk About Growing Up in a Stepfamily, 38 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 83, 92-93 (2003).
See, e.g., Eirik Evenhouse & Siobhan Reilly, A Sibling Study ofStepchild WellBeing, 39 J. Hum. RESOURCES 248 (2004). Sociobiologists and others also claim
that stepparents are significantly more likely to abuse their stepchildren than
biological parents are, see, e.g., Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, An Assessment
ofSome ProposedExceptions to the Phenomenon ofNepotistic Discrimination
Against Stepchildren, 38 ANNALES ZOOLOGICI FENNICI 287 (2001). I omit
discussion of studies on this topic because they appear to be heavily ideological
and inconclusive, see Francesca Adler-Baeder, What Do We Know About the
PhysicalAbuse of Stepchildren? A Review of the Literature, 44 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 67 (2006); Johanna Nordlund & Hans Temrin, Do Characteristics
of ParentalChild Homicide in Sweden Fit Evolutionary Predictions?, 113
ETHOLOGY

26
27

28
29

1029 (2007).

Keith Zvoch, Family Type andInvestment in Education:A ComparisonofGenetic
and Stepparent Families, 20 EVOLUTION & Hum. BEHAv. 453, 461-62 (1999).
Maria Schmeeckle, Gender Dynamics in Stepfamilies: Adult Stepchildren's
Views, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 174, 182-83 (2007). Men, by contrast, appear
to invest more in the child or children of their current mate, those with whom
they reside, id; see also Kermyt G. Anderson et al., PaternalCare by Genetic
Fathers and Stepfathers 1: Reports from Albuquerque Men, 20 EVOLUTION &
HuM. BEHAV. 405 (1999).
Chambers, supra note 24, at 103-08.
See, e.g., id. at 104-06; Constance R. Ahrons, Family Ties After Divorce:

Long-Term Implicationsfor Children, 46 FAM. PROCESS 53, 61 (2006); Maria
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or her life, the more likely that the two will develop a strong bond. Adolescent
children are difficult for a stepparent to bond with, and there are indications
that they tend to fare worse in stepfamilies in general. 30 Similarly, studies of
children living with cohabitants show that the impact of cohabitation varies
with the age of the child, with adolescents experiencing more emotional and
behavioral problems and six- to eleven-year-olds experiencing lower levels
of engagement in school, after controlling for parental economic resources. 3'
The quality of the stepparent-stepchild relationship can also vary based on
the degree of involvement of the child's nonresidential parent. In this and in
other respects, stepfathers tend to have an easier time than stepmothers. Their
counterparts, noncustodial fathers, play a peripheral role in most children's lives
and may become even less active after the mother remarries.32 Less is expected
of stepfathers than of stepmothers, given widespread cultural expectations of
the role of a mother within a family; this works to the advantage of stepfathers
in entering this new relationship, which it is important to build slowly. 33 The
more detached parenting style of fathers and of stepfathers can assist in this
transition.34 Yet stepfathers are a varied group in this respect as well. Some
choose to become very involved in the lives of their stepchildren, and may
even come to replace the natural father in the child's life if the noncustodial
parent plays little role in it and the new marriage lasts a considerable period
of time. 35 Other stepparents, of whichever sex, choose to remain distanced

Schmeeckle et al., What Makes Someone Family? Adult Children ' Perceptions
ofCurrent andFormerStepparents, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 595, 597-98 (2006);
see also Philip A. Fisher et al., ParentalMonitoring of Children'sBehavior:
VariationAcross Stepmother Stepfather,and Two-ParentBiologicalFamilies,
52 FAM. REL. 45 (2003) (finding that monitoring, an indicator of positive child

outcomes, became more common in stepfather families over time).
30 See Kyrre Breivik & Dan Olweus, Adolescents'Adjustment in FourPost-Divorce
Family Structures: Single Mother Stepfather JointPhysical Custody and Single
FatherFamilies,44 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 99 (2006).
31 Susan L. Brown, Family Structure and Child Well-Being: The Significance of
ParentalCohabitation,66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 351, 364 (2004).

32

MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE LEGAL
BATTLE, AND WHAT WE CAN

Do ABOUT

IT

127-28 (1999); Malia, supra note 2,

at 305.
33

Anne C. Bernstein, Women in Stepfamilies: The Fairy Godmother the Wicked
Witch, and Cinderella Reconstructed, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION 205, 207-09

(Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 11th ed. 2001); Schmeeckle,
supra note 27, at 178-79.
34 Bernstein, supra note 33, at 209.
35

Eric G. Andersen, Children, Parents,and Nonparents:ProtectedInterests and
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from their partner's child, especially if that child was an adolescent at the
time of the remarriage.3 6
Stepmothers are much rarer than stepfathers (eighty-six percent of
residential stepparents are male and, as noted above, seventy-five percent of
cohabiting stepparents)." The role of a stepmother is very challenging, in part
because noncustodial mothers typically play a larger role in their children's
lives. The continuing presence of two mothers, with all of the cultural
expectations placed upon mothers, can present not only a conflictual situation
for the two women but also a conflict of loyalty for the child. 39 Moreover, our
societal assumptions about "mothering" result in more intensive interaction
with the stepchild, increasing the potential for conflict.4 0
In short, the relationships between children and their stepparents clearly
differ in a number of ways from the relationships children have with parents
with whom they have lived since birth. This is a disadvantage stepchildren
share with children both of single mothers and of cohabitants. 4 1 However, large
numbers of American children no longer live in married families with their
biological parents, and stepfamilies of various sorts are currently the fastest
growing family form and include the largest group of residential parents .42
It is frequently assumed that the stepparent-stepchild relationship will
simply disappear if the parent's marriage dissolves. Studies of stepfamilies
across time show that this is not necessarily true. Although some stepchildren
no longer think of their former stepparents as part of their family system
after divorce, for others this relationship continues to be important. 43 Its
Legal Standards, 1998 BYU L. REV. 935, 963; see also LAWRENCE H. GANONG
& MARILYN COLEMAN, STEPFAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DEVELOPMENT, DYNAMICS, AND
INTERVENTIONS 128-30 (2004).
36 Chambers, supra note 24, at 106; Pollet, supra note 11, at 530.

37

38
39
40
41
42

Mary Ann Mason & Nicole Zayac, Rethinking Stepparent Rights: Has the ALI
Founda Better Definition?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 227, 249 (2002); see also supra text

accompanying note 9.
LAWRENCE H. GANONG & MARILYN COLEMAN, REMARRIED FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
78 (1994).
Id.; Bernstein, supra note 33, at 208-09.
Bernstein, supra note 33, at 209; Schmeeckle, supra note 27, at 179.
Brown, supra note 31, at 364 (child outcomes are similar whether a parent
remarries or forms a cohabiting stepfamily).
MASON, supra note 32, at 120; Lynn D. Wardle, The Evolving Rights and Duties
ofStep-Parents:Making New Rulesfor New Families,in PARENTHOOD

IN MODERN

SOCIETY: LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

377 (John

Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic eds., 1993).
43

CompareJason D. Hans et al., FinancialResponsibilitiesToward Older Parents
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continuation, unsurprisingly, appears to depend upon the length of the
relationship, the age of the child at its initiation, the strength of the bond
formed, and the nature of the divorce.44 Even if the child's parent goes on
to marry again, it is important in many cases to protect these relationships;
doing so can preserve important emotional and material resources derived by
stepchildren from them. 45 Contrary to the exclusive parenthood assumption
underlying U.S. family law, additional adults in a child's life can be valuable
in many ways; and it is now commonly accepted that children are able to
adjust to multiple "parents" - indeed, that those relationships may prove
helpful or essential to their needs.4 6
11. CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT OF MARRIED AND COHABITING
STEPPARENTS WITH RESPECT TO CUSTODY, VISITATION, AND
CHILD SUPPORT

Because cohabiting relationships can be valuable to children living in these
families, I argue that U.S. family law should protect these relationships with
respect to custody, visitation, and child support. Before doing so, in this Part,
I examine how cohabiting stepparent-stepchild relationships are treated under
current law and what the typical results of that treatment are. I also discuss
how current law treats residential stepparents and how their legal status has
begun to change, although it remains precarious in most states.
A. Unmarried and Married Stepparents Under CurrentU.S. Law: Custody
Married and unmarried stepparents confront substantial obstacles to continuing
their relationship with their partner's child if the natural parent dies or their
relationship dissolves. Custody is virtually impossible to obtain. Cases in
which cohabitants petition for custody typically result in almost peremptory
and Stepparents Following Divorce and Remarriage, 30 J. FAM.

ECON. ISSUES

55 (2009), with Schmeeckle et al., supra note 29.
44 Ahrons, supranote 29, at 60-61; David R. Fine & Mark A.Fine, Learningfrom
Social Sciences: A ModelforReformation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97
DICK. L. REv. 49, 65 (1992); Lawrence Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, Obligations
to StepparentsAcquired in Later Life: RelationshipQuality andAcuity ofNeeds,

61B J. GERONTOLOGY S80, S86-87 (2006).
45 Freisthler et al., supra note 24, at 98-99.
46 Malia,supra note 2, at 308; Pollet, supranote 11, at 533. Aging former stepparents
may also derive benefits from continuing this relationship, see Hans et al., supra
note 43.
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148
has adopted his or her stepchild, which is rare,4
denial.47 Unless a stepparent
the stepparent-stepchild relationship has been regarded as derivative of the
relationship to the other parent and thus not to survive termination of the
marriage. 49 Appellate courts have repeatedly reversed trial court awards
of custody to stepparents.s0 The reasons for doing so include the strong
preference, or presumption, for custody in a fit natural parent; American law
is also very protective of the rights of noncustodial parents yet reluctant to
recognize more than two parents."
To assert a claim to custody, a stepparent must first establish standing
based either on a state statute concerning third-party custody or by showing
that he or she is a psychological or defacto parent to the child, or stands in
locoparentis,all of which require the stepparent's intentional assumption of
an active parental role in the child's life and the existence of a parent-child
relationship between them.5 2 After establishing standing, the stepparent must
still defeat the parental presumption, which can be difficult to do in the
absence of a finding of parental unfitness. Although developing case law
in some areas indicates that this presumption may be rebutted by showing
detriment to the child if not placed in the custody of the stepparent, in other
states, a court may simply deny standing to a stepparent. For example, in a
2001 New York case, a nonbiological father had lived with a young child and
the child's mother for six years, during which they had formed a close and
loving relationship, but the court found that he did not even have standing to
be heard on the question of custody."

47 See, e.g., Engel v. Kenner, 926 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Custody
of Dombrowski (Dombrowski v. Goodright), 705 P.2d 1218 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985); Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. 1999); In re Nelson, 825 A.2d
501 (N.H. 2003).
Kathleen A. Lamb, "I Want to Be Just Like Their Real Dad": FactorsAssociated
with StepfatherAdoption, 28. J. FAM. ISSUES 1162, 1183 (2007).
49 June Carbone, The Legal Definition ofParenthood: Uncertaintyat the Core of
Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1312-13 (2005).
50 See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects ofthe StepparentChildRelationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 63-64 (1984).
51 Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their
Stepchildren,40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 84-88 (2006). Mahoney opines that courts simply
48

give up in the face of the diversity of stepfamily relationships, despairing of
finding a rule that could apply to them all, id. at 97-100.
52 Id at 100; Malia, supra note 2, at 303.
53 Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); see also Lawrence
Schlam, Third-Party "Standing" and Child Custody Disputes in Washington:
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Courts have nonetheless found ways to award custody to stepparents,
both married and unmarried, in extraordinary cases where a child's welfare
demands this result. The case most frequently cited as an example is In re
Allen,54 a 1981 case in which a married stepmother was awarded custody
of her deaf stepson without a finding that the biological parents were unfit.
Neither his divorced parents nor his grandparents appeared capable of
dealing appropriately with his disability, but his stepmother taught him sign
language, learned it herself, and found him special educational training, as a
result of which he flourished." In the custody contest that accompanied the
couple's separation after four years of marriage, the court awarded custody
to the stepmother based on the best interest of the child. The court of appeals
affirmed, but held that the best interest standard was not appropriate in a case
involving a nonparent, instead making a kind of intermediate finding that the
father was unsuitable to parent this particular child with his special needs and
the child's development would be detrimentally affected by placement with
him. 6 Thus custody was awarded to the stepmother without terminating the
father's relationship to his son. The outcome of this case, commentators agree,
was a good one, but the judge was stretching the law to reach it."
Similarly, a cohabiting stepmother who had been the primary caretaker
of her former partner's diabetic daughter for six years was awarded custody
in a North Carolina case because neither the father nor his elderly parents
were able to care appropriately for her diabetes." (The child's biological
mother had been in a comatose and vegetative state since the birth.5 9) Again,
the court clearly was reaching beyond accepted legal categories to avoid
what it considered a tragic outcome, awarding custody without requiring
Non-ParentRights - Past,Present, and ... Future?, 43 GoNz. L. REV. 391,

445-46 (2007-2008) (discussing approaches taken by different states).
54 In re Allen, 626 P.2d 16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
55 Id. at 19-20.

56 Id. at 22-23.
57

Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking ParenthoodAs an Exclusive Status: The Need
for LegalAlternatives When the Premise of the NuclearFamily Has Failed,70
VA. L. REV. 879, 916-17 (1984); Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilitiesfor
Extended FamilyMembers?, 27 FAM. L.Q. 191, 195-98 (1993). Revisiting Allen

in a 2005 case involving the parental rights of a nonbiological lesbian mother, the
Washington Supreme Court interpreted it instead as a precursor of the equitable
defacto parent doctrine adopted in the later case, but subsequently refused to
extend the doctrine to stepparents! See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 168
(Wash. 2005) (en banc); In re Parentage of M.F., 228 P.3d 1270 (Wash. 2010)
(en banc) (holding that de facto parent doctrine does not apply to stepparents).
58 Ellison v. Ramos, 502 S.E.2d 891, 896-97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
59 Id. at 892.
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the establishment of standing under a statute or equitable principle such
as estoppel or defacto parenthood and without a hearing to determine that
the father was unfit. More recently, other courts have applied a similar
standard in stepparent custody cases where the threatened harm to the child
was not physical but purely emotional in nature - neither the best interest
test appropriate to custody contests between two biological parents nor the
unfitness standard traditionally required to deprive a natural parent of custody.60
In short, whether it involves stretching the law or developing a new and
intermediate standard, courts do in rare cases award custody to a stepparent.
This is most likely when, for example, a natural parent has left a child in the
custody of the stepparent for a lengthy period or when a mother has allowed
her husband to believe that he was the child's biological parent and he has
played an active parenting role since birth.6' Courts also appear to be more
sympathetic to stepparent claims in cases where the child has been living with
a natural parent and a stepparent for some time and the natural parent dies.62
But the case law is conflicting and varies from state to state.63

60 See, e.g., Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 153-54 (Alaska 2002) (awarding
joint custody to a stepmother who had served as a child's "psychological parent"
during her six-year marriage to the girl's father because to sever the relationship
would cause severe harm to the child).
61 Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1997) (holding that a father who had
been told, falsely, that he was the child's biological father, and to whose care the
mother essentially abandoned the child for several years, may be given custody
based on the best interest of the child); see also Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
62 See, e.g., Tailor v. Becker, 708 A.2d 626 (Del. 1998) (decided under a Delaware
statute that mandates use of the best interest standard in cases involving death of
the natural parent); see also Kimberly R. Lusk, What Rights Do You Have to My
Child?Analysis ofStepparent VisitationRights, 23 CHILD. LEGALRTs. J. 21 (2003).

But see Dodge v. Dodge, 505 S.E.2d 344 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding custody
of the child to the biological father after the mother's death); Simons v. Gisvold,
519 N.W.2d 585 (N.D. 1994) (affirming an award of custody to the natural mother
after the child had lived almost from birth with the stepmother and natural father,
who had just died, on grounds that the mother had always maintained a relationship
with the girl and thus she would not suffer serious detriment if removed from her
father's home and transferred to the custody of her mother).
63

See, e.g., Levy, supra note 57, at 196.
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B. Unmarried and Married Stepparents Under Current U.S. Law:
Visitation
While neither married nor cohabiting stepparents are likely to gain custody,
they will be treated differently from each other with respect to visitation.
A married stepparent is increasingly likely to be awarded visitation upon
dissolution of the marriage, but the second parent in a cohabiting relationship
must struggle even to obtain access. Many petitions for visitation by
cohabitants are dismissed simply for lack of standing, preventing any hearing
on the merits of the particular case.64 Others founder on the requirement
that a nonbiological parent show that denial of visitation would clearly be
detrimental to the child or that other extraordinary circumstances exist, a
difficult standard to overcome.65 In one Iowa case, for example, a woman
had lived for five years with a young child and his father, who was a truck
driver frequently away from home; she had served in the role of the child's
primary parent on a daily basis. 66 When the relationship between the adults
ended after the birth of two additional children, she was denied visitation even
though this also terminated the boy's relationship with his two half-sisters and
despite the court's own belief that visitation was in the child's best interest.
The Iowa Supreme Court held that it had no authority to grant visitation to a
nonparent in the face of the biological parent's opposition. 7
64 See, e.g., Taylor v. Kennedy, 649 So.2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that the lower court lacked authority to award visitation to a cohabitant of six
years' standing).
65 See, e.g., Stockey v. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that visitation may not be allowed under California third-party visitation statute
in face of opposition of biological parents without a showing that denial of
visitation would be detrimental to the child); Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d
253, 256 (S.D. 1991) (holding that visitation must be denied to a cohabitant of
seven years in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness or "extraordinary
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child"); D.G. v. D.M.K., 557 N.W.2d
235, 243 (S.D. 1997) (holding that there is no legal basis to award visitation to a
former cohabitant with whom the child had lived for a year after her biological
mother had left the state in the absence of extraordinary circumstances). Thirdparty visitation statutes often set a higher standard for custody than for visitation,
requiring, for example, proof that "it would be significantly detrimental to the
child to remain or be placed in the custody of either of the child's living legal
parents who wish to retain or obtain custody," Aiuz. REV. STAT. § 25-415A(2)
(2007); see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.119(4)(a)-(b) (2009).
66 In re Marriage of Freel, 448 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1989).
67 Id. at 27-28; see also Bruce v. Sarver, 522 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 1994) (holding
that a common law veto power by custodial parents over visitation between
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Most states now have statutes that allow visitation by third parties, usually
inspired by grandparents' desire for visitation after the death or divorce of
their own child, the grandchild's parent. Most of these statutes are limited by
their terms to grandparents and some include stepparents, but several define
the third parties broadly enough to include former cohabitants. 68 The statute
regarding visitation by unmarried persons in Minnesota, for example, provides
that cohabitants of two years' duration are entitled to a hearing on the question
of visitation and entitled to visitation if they can show that they have bonded
closely with their former cohabitant's child, that visitation would be in the
child's best interest, that it would not interfere with the child's relationship
to its biological parent, and that, if the child is old enough, the child wants
to continue the relationship with the former cohabitant. 69
Cohabitants unable to take advantage of a third-party visitation statute
have asserted standing based on the defacto parent doctrine, on their status
in locoparentis or as a psychological parent, or on other equitable doctrines.
These doctrines have been developed most extensively and successfully in the
context of cases involving lesbian couples who have had children by artificial
insemination of one of the partners. 0 This situation is quite different from that
of a stepparent, who enters the family only as a consequence of a relationship
to the biological parent some time after the child was born. Nonetheless, the
developing case law about lesbian parents encourages courts to decide cases
regarding opposite-sex cohabiting parents under it. For example, in one of
the first cases to hold that a court had equitable powers to grant visitation to a
lesbian in a parent-like relationship, the Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically
child and all third parties except for the other biological parent prevented the
court from granting visitation to a man who had served in the role of the child's
father and supported her for several years); Ash v. Kotecki, 507 N.W.2d 400
(Iowa 1993) (holding that there is no basis under common law or statute to
grant visitation to a man who had lived with a child for one year and exercised
68

69
70

visitation with her for four years after cohabitation ended).
Pollet, supra note 11, at 533-34. Third-party visitation statutes are very diverse,
see Stephen Hellman, The Child, The Step Parent, and the State: Step Parent
Visitationand the Voice ofthe Child, 16 ToURo L. REv. 45, 51-53 (1999); Richard
S. Victor et al., Statutory Review of Third-Party Rights Regarding Custody,
Visitation, and Support, 25 FAM. L.Q. 19 (1991) (including in an appendix
the language of all fifty states' statutes); see also Pollet, supra note 11, at 536
(describing the results of an all-states' survey).
Mnia. STAT. ANN. § 257C.08(4) (2007).
See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); Mason v. Dwinnell,
660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Boring Jones, 884 A.2d 915 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2005).
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relied upon its own prior case governing the dissolution of a relationship
between opposite-sex cohabitants.' Justice Shirley Abrahamson provided a
structure of analysis that has been borrowed by courts in other states, holding
that a court should proceed to decide whether visitation is in the best interest
of the child if the petitioner proves four elements:
(1) [T]hat the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered,
the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in
the same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child's care,
education and development, including contributing towards the child's
support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that
the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient
to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship
parental in nature.72
Other courts, following Justice Abrahamson's analysis in same-sex parent
visitation cases, have specifically agreed that the same standard would govern
a case involving unmarried opposite-sex couples as well. 3
Some states have concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v.
Granville7 4 prevents such a conclusion, whether the former partners were of
the same or opposite sex." In Troxel, involving visitation by grandparents, the
Supreme Court found that Washington's visitation statute was unconstitutionally
broad because it did not defer to a fit parent's determination that visitation was
not in the child's best interest. The visitation statute in California, for example,
purports to award visitation to stepparents based on a best interest finding

71

Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (relying on Watts v. Watts, 448
N.W.2d 292 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), a case in which the same court held that it had
equitable powers to decide property disputes between unmarried cohabitants).

72

Id. at 421.

73 See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 2000) ("[T]he standard we
enunciate is applicable to all persons who have willingly, and with the approval
of the legal parent, undertaken the duties of a parent to a child not related by
blood or adoption").
74 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
75 See, e.g., Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 86-87, 93 (Md. 2008) (refusing
to follow pre-Troxel Maryland case law and holding that the court erred in
granting visitation to a nonbiological lesbian mother on the grounds that she
was a defacto parent without finding either that the biological mother was unfit
or that exceptional circumstances overcame the parental presumption).
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alone, raising the question of its constitutionality under Troxel." In 2003, a
California appellate court held that courts deciding cases under this statute
must nonetheless apply the Troxel-mandated presumption that the natural
parents were acting in the child's best interest in opposing visitation and that
"[w]here natural parents are unified in opposition, nonparental visitation can
be ordered only if such visitation is in the best interest of the child and denial
of visitation would be detrimental to the child."" Similarly, when interpreting
its own visitation statute in light of Troxel in a case involving cohabitants,
Arizona read a parental presumption into it, holding that "the court should
apply a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's decision to deny or limit
visitation was made in the child's best interests."" Other states with third-party
visitation statutes broad enough to cover cohabitants include some form of
the parental presumption in their text, but it is unclear how the presumption
could be rebutted.79
Despite substantial legal obstacles, cohabitants have in a few cases
succeeded in asserting standing to seek visitation.so The former cohabitant
must still go on to convince the court that visitation is in the child's best

76

77

78

See Diane L. Abraham, California's Stepparent Visitation Statute: For the
Welfare of the Child, or a Court-OpenedDoorto Legally Interfere with Parental
Autonomy: Where Are the ConstitutionalSafeguards?, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 125 (1997) (arguing, pre-Troxel, that the California visitation
statute could not survive constitutional challenge); Melissa Curry, Who Gets to
Visit? A History of Third-Party Visitation Rights in Family Court, 16 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUEs 289, 292-98 (2007); Lusk, supra note 62.
In re Marriage of W., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 464-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); see
also Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the
California grandparental visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied in
light of Troxel).
Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213, 1224 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (remanding
for consideration under the parental presumption). The Arizona visitation statute
applied to any person who has been "in loco parentis," meaning "a person who
has been treated as a parent by the child and who has formed a meaningful
parental relationship with the child for a substantial period of time." ARuz. REV.
STAT. § 25-415(G)(1) (2007). Since Troxel, the Connecticut statute has also been
held to be unconstitutional in cases involving grandparental visitation if applied

without requiring a showing that the child would suffer real and significant harm
79
80

if visitation were denied, Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002); Crockett
v. Pastore, 789 A.2d 453 (Conn. 2002).
See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 125C.050(2), 125C.050(2)(4), 125C.050(2)(6)
(2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.119(1), 109.119(2), 109.119(4) (2009).
See, e.g., Barker v. Briggs, 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 623 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996).
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interest, and he or she is unlikely to succeed if there is another biological
parent or parent figure of the same sex in the picture.'
The legal treatment of married stepparents is somewhat better, but
nonetheless inadequate. Courts have long been more willing to award
visitation to stepparents than to award them custody.82 Typically a stepparent
will seek visitation based on the in loco parentis doctrine or as a defacto or
psychological parent." In making its decision, the court will take into account
factors such as the length of the relationship, the age of the child, any detriment
to the child in cutting off contact, and, if the child is old enough, the child's
own wishes.8 4 It is clearly easier to show that cutting off all contact after a
stepparent-stepchild relationship of long standing would be detrimental to a
child than to show that custody should be vested in a nonparent, as courts and
commentators have come to believe that continued contact with a stepparent
after divorce is generally in the child's best interest."
C. Unmarried and Married Stepparents Under Current U.S. Law: Child
Support
Traditionally, stepparents had no duty to support their stepchildren other
than indirectly, by support of the child's natural parent if they were married.86
Some argue that to impose a support obligation as a matter of law would
be a disincentive to remarriage, or at least a disincentive to marry someone
with children." As of 2000, however, eighteen states had passed statutes
imposing such an obligation upon stepparents during their marriage to the
81 Temple v. Meyer, 544 A.2d 629, 632 (Conn. 1988) (denying visitation to a man
who had believed he was the child's biological father since birth and had served
as primary caretaker on the grounds that the mother was now living with another
man who had stepped into the role of psychological parent).
82 See, e.g., Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (remanding
for decision under the best interest standard); see also Janet Leach Richards,
Redefining Parenthood:ParentalRights Versus Child Rights, 40 WAYNE L.
1227, 1246-48 (1994).

REV.

83 See Hellman, supra note 68, at 53-56.
84

Sarah H. Ramsey, Stepparents and the Law: A Nebulous Status and a Needfor
Reform, in STEPPARENTING: ISSUES IN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 217, 22627 (Kay Pasley & Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 1994).

85

Hellman, supra note 68.

86

Laurence C. Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty of Support: Beyond the
Biological Tie - But How FarBeyond the Marital Tie?, 41 SANTA CLARA L.

87

REv. 1, 7-8 (2000).
Levy, supra note 57, at 210.
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child's parent.88 Some states with stepparent support statutes specify that the
child's natural parent remains primarily responsible for his or her support
and the stepparent is secondarily liable.89 By contrast, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court has held that the duty to stepchildren is identical to that owed
to the stepparent's own biological children."o Other states' courts have reached
conflicting conclusions about this allocation.9t
In some states, a duty of support has been derived from the stepparent's
assumption of parental responsibility under the common law in loco parentis
doctrine. 92 This obligation, like that to a spouse during the marriage, is
enforceable only by creditors, not by the children.93 It may nonetheless arise
in a number of situations involving the stepparent's support obligations to
children of a previous union, the child support obligation of the noncustodial
parent, and the calculation of needs-based government benefits.
A more controversial question is whether a stepparent has a child support
duty after divorce from the child's natural parent. The doctrines of in loco
parentis or defacto parenthood are of little help to a parent seeking child
support from a former stepparent, because each status is voluntary and can be
terminated at will. 94 The state of North Dakota imposes such an obligation by
statute so long as the stepchildren remain in the stepparent's family, but not
after divorce from the child's biological parent." The courts in some other
states impose a duty of continued support on the basis of equitable estoppel,
where, for example, a stepfather has accepted a child into his family, treating
him as his own, and represented to the child that he was in fact his father.96
A similar logic, based on detriment to the child from long reliance upon the
stepparent, underlay the leading case on this issue, the 1984 decision of the
88

Nolan, supra note 86, at 10-11.

89

Sarah H. Ramsey & Judith M. Masson, StepparentSupport of Stepchildren:A
Comparative Analysis of Policies and Problems in the American and English
Experience, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 659, 667 (1985).

90 Logan v. Logan, 424 A.2d 403, 404 (N.H. 1980) (holding that a stepparent's
obligations to children in a second family should be taken into account on a
motion to modify support owed to biological children under a previous divorce
decree).

91

See, e.g., Feltman v. Feltman, 434 N.W.2d 590, 592 (S.D. 1989) (holding that

92
93
94
95

priority must be given to children of a first family).
Mahoney, supra note 50, at 41-43; Ramsey & Masson, supra note 89, at 673-74.
Mahoney, supra note 50, at 42-43.
Ramsey & Masson, supra note 89, at 673.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (2009); see also Ramsey & Masson, supra note
89, at 671-72.

96 Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
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Supreme Court of New Jersey in Miller v. Miller.97 In Miller,the stepfather had
been in locoparentisto his wife's children during their seven-year marriage,
supporting them and actively discouraging any support or visitation from
their natural father, who eventually dropped out of his children's lives.98 The
court found that the stepfather had made representations about emotional and
financial support upon which the girls had relied to their detriment, ordered
him to pay support during the pendency of the divorce litigation, and to
continue doing so after the divorce was final if the girls' mother could not
locate the natural father and resuscitate his support of them.99
In short, when a stepparent essentially replaces a child's natural parent not
only emotionally but also as a source of support, he or she may be required
to pay permanent child support after divorce from the child's other parent.
Cohabitants attempting to claim child support from an unmarried stepparent
under Miller's equitable estoppel theory have not been successful.'"0 Those
attempting to claim on a theory of contract between the cohabitants have not
fared much better.'0

III.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL CHANGE

In this Part I discuss, first, proposals a number of legal scholars have made for
change in the treatment of the stepparent-stepchild relationship with respect
to custody, visitation, and child support after the remarriage dissolves, to
see whether any of these suggestions might provide a good model for the
analogous relationship between cohabiting parents and their partners' children.
After describing those models, I offer some recommendations of my own,
along with reasons why I believe that legal change in this area is desirable.

97 Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
98 Id. at 353-54.
99 Id. at 359.

100 See Zaragoza v. Capriola, 492 A.2d 698 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
101 See Thomas v. LaRosa, 300 S.E.2d 809 (W.Va. 1990) (holding that agreements
between cohabitants are not enforceable in West Virginia); Featherston v.

Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that an implied in
fact contract to support her and her children did not exist because the female
cohabitant did not overcome the presumption that her services were rendered
gratuitously).
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A. Proposals Concerning the Married Stepparent-Stepchild Relationship
Legal scholars have been making recommendations for legal reform
concerning custody and visitation of stepchildren at least since Kate Bartlett's
seminal 1984 article, Rethinking ParenthoodAsan Exclusive Status.102 Bartlett
urged that a stepparent should be considered a potential custodial parent if
he or she had served as a psychological parent to the stepchild, requiring a
relationship of six months or more, a mutuality of affection, and the consent
of the child's natural parent at the time the relationship began. 0 If the
stepparent can demonstrate a stronger relationship with the child than the
natural parent has, custody should be awarded; alternatively, the stepparent
should be allowed to share joint custody with his or her ex-spouse.104 However,
in the context of the natural parent's death, Bartlett argued for a presumption
that the child remain in the home in which he or she had been living, that is,
with the residential stepparent."o In both instances, rights would be shared
with the other natural parent or parents, even though this flies in the face of
American law's distaste for multiple parenthood. It was important, Bartlett
argued, to develop "determinate, principled standards" for these decisions.'0 6
Other commentators would simply trust judges to reach "outside doctrinal
parameters" to rescue any children who might be harmed by them.' Visitation
by ex-stepparents has occasioned much less resistance than custody because
it is less of an incursion into the exclusive status of biological parenthood.'s
Nonetheless Bartlett argues for a stronger presumption, that visitation with a
psychological parent "should be denied only if the custodial parent satisfies
a heavy burden of proof that the visits are actually detrimental to the child,"
effectively reversing the standard applied by many courts.'
Many legal scholars favor imposing some kind of child support obligation
on stepparents after divorce. David Chambers has opined that a rule imposing
one year of support after divorce for every two years of co-residence might
be appropriate on the grounds that "adults should be responsible for the
102 Bartlett, supra note 57.
103 Id. at 946-49, 953-54. By a somewhat similar logic, David Chambers argued for
a presumption that a young child should be placed in the custody of whoever
had been his or her long-term primary caretaker, whether that be a parent or
stepparent, see Chambers, supra note 24, at 127.
104 Bartlett, supra note 57, at 953-54.
105 Id.

106
107
108
109

Id. at 962.
Levy, supra note 57, at 194-98.
Id. at 201.
Bartlett, supra note 57, at 950.
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dependencies they have fostered and encouraged." 0 Other family law
scholars agree that some type of limited duration child support is appropriate
as a kind of transitional safety net for stepchildren.'"
Some American scholars, such as Margaret Mahoney, point to the "child
of the family" doctrine in the United Kingdom as a possible model.'l 2 Since
1958, English law has included stepparents in the group of adults who may
be obligated to support children after divorce.'"' In 1970, this obligation was
incorporated into the Matrimonial Causes Act, which defines a child of the
family to include "any [nonbiological] child . . . who has been treated by

both of these parties as a child of their family."" 4 A court deciding whether to
impose such an obligation on a stepparent is to consider the extent to which the
stepparent supported the child during the marriage, the length of the marriage,
and the liability of any other person to maintain the child."' Canada has
adopted a system somewhat similar to that in Britain, but the judge's discretion
to determine the amount of support is limited by formulaic guidelines; and
the Canadian scheme applies to cohabiting stepfamilies as well as married
ones." 6 The stepparent's responsibility is deemed to be secondary to that of
the biological parent, but joint and several liability may be imposed, forcing
a stepparent to sue the noncustodial parent for contribution."

110 Chambers, supra note 24, at 128.
Ill See, e.g., MASON, supra note 32, at 135-36; Mary Ann Mason & David W.
Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: FederalLegislation in Search ofa Model, 29

112
113

114
115
116

FAM. L.Q. 445, 477-79 (1995) (recommending that residential stepparents who
have been responsible for fifty percent or more of their stepchildren's support
be required to continue supporting them either for the number of years during
which they had been dependent on the stepparent or until their majority).
Mahoney, supra note 50, at 59-60; see also Mason & Simon, supra note 111,
at 478.
It is also possible to obtain an order of support against a stepparent during the
marriage, if he or she has accepted the child into the family (which is generally
assumed if the child is residing with the stepparent), see Ramsey & Masson,
supra note 89, at 689-91.
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 52(1) (Eng.) (discussed in Ramsey &
Masson, supra note 89, at 694).
Id. § 25(4) (discussed in Ramsey & Masson, supra note 89, at 696).
See Carol Rogerson, The Child Support ObligationofStep-Parents, 18 CAN. J.
FAM. L. 9, 15-16, 51 (2001); see also Barbara Graham-Siegenthaler, Support
Obligations ofStepparentsand Persons "In Loco Parentis" in a Comparative
and International Context, in FAMILIEs ACROSS FRONTIERS 765, 775-84 (Nigel

Lowe & Gillian Douglas eds., 1996).
117 Rogerson, supra note 116, at 106-07, 119.
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B. Recommendations Concerning the Unmarried Stepparent-Stepchild
Relationship
Returning to the context of cohabiting stepparents and their stepchildren,
what principles should guide the choice of appropriate legal remedy? First,
we should focus upon the interests of the children affected rather than of the
adults involved. These interests may vary with the issues involved. In the area
of custody and visitation, the goal should be to allow children to preserve
emotional connections importantto them despite the adults' separation. Many
relationships with the partner of a child's parent may be very important, but
not all will be, necessitating some screening mechanism to determine which
are and which are not. With respect to child support, the concern should be
about the impact of the sudden disappearance of economic support upon which
a child depends and protection of the child at a time of upheaval over which
he or she has no control. As Mahoney has said in the context of stepparent
obligation, "[t]he act of forming a de facto family . . . and establishing a
home with stepchildren, like the procreative act, may reasonably give rise to
economic responsibility for the children.""
To screen claims for custody, I would adopt a standing requirement
modeled on that which Justice Abrahamson outlined in Holtzman v Knott in
the context of visitation by cohabitants:
(1) that the biological parent fostered the establishment of a parent-like
relationship between the cohabitant and the child; (2) that the cohabitant
and child lived together; (3) that the cohabitant assumed significant
responsibility for the child's care, education, and development,
including contributing to the child's support; and (4) that the cohabitant
has been in a parental role long enough to have established with the
child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature."I
If a cohabitant fulfills these four criteria, there should be a rebuttable
presumption in favor of awarding custody to him or her if the child's natural
parent should die, in order to maintain stability in the child's life in the midst
of disruption. If the adults separate, however, a presumption in favor of the
cohabitant who is the biological parent should apply, subject to rebuttal based
on a showing of detriment to the child; and joint custody should be considered
in cases appropriate for it.

118 Mahoney, supra note 50, at 48.
119 Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995). The state of Delaware
has recently adopted a similar standard by statute, 77 DEL. LAWS c. 97 §§ 1-3
(2009).
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If the parties have lived together as a family for six months or more,
there should be a presumption in favor of visitation if both the child and excohabitant desire it.' 20 Sudden disruption of a relationship with a member of
their functional family is not healthy for children; and studies have shown that
they are adaptable in adjusting to, and benefit from, relationships with multiple
parents.12 ' To incorporate this proposal into American law, a state's highest
court must successfully distinguish the relationship between cohabitants and
their partners' children from that between children and their grandparents, to
escape the parental presumption set out in Troxel. In the typical case, children
will not have lived with their grandparents, but only have visited with them
while the parents were together. A cohabitant, by contrast, has lived with his
partner's child, sharing home and daily life for some time, and may even
have served as the primary caretaker. In lesbian co-parenting cases, courts
are beginning to recognize that Troxel should not apply. If the nonbiological
partner is found, based on a four-part test like that set forth above, to be a
de facto parent, the dispute is no longer between a parent and a third party
but between two parents.' 22 Although similar reasoning should apply to a
stepparent, courts have resisted following it because the interests of more
than two persons would then be involved.123
As for child support, after a period of two years of co-residence with the
child - a period after which one may presume that family members have
become economically interdependent 24 - a cohabitant should be liable for
child support upon separation from the child's parent. A sudden cessation of
support can have disastrous consequences for children living in cohabiting
families. Support should be apportioned between the two ex-cohabitants and

120 For dissenting views, see William C. Duncan, The Legal Fiction of De Facto
Parenthood,36 J. LEGIS. 263 (2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson, UndeservedTrust:
Reflections on the ALI's Treatment of De Facto Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE
FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF

FAMILY DISSOLUTION 90 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
121 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 57, at 881-82; Lynn White & Joan G. Gilbreth,
When Children Have Two Fathers:Effects of Relationshipswith Stepfathers
and NoncustodialFathers on Adolescent Outcomes, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.

155 (2001).
122 See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920 (Del. 2011); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d
161 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
123 In re Parentage of M.F., 228 P.3d 1270, 1272 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (describing a
case where a stepparent fulfilled the four-factor test as involving not "competing
interests of two parents" but "a third party to M.F.'s two existing parents").

124 See BOWMAN, supra note 3, at 225-26.
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the child's other natural parent, so as not to encourage the disappearance of the
noncustodial parent from the child's life; but they should be jointly liable for it.
Like Professor Bartlett, I do not think we can simply rely on judges to
make extralegal decisions to rescue children in deserving cases, nor do I think
that would be good for the legitimacy of our system of family law. Instead,
any new standards should be established by statute, to prevent, insofar as
possible, inconsistent and unpredictable judicial decisions in this area. With
clear expectations, moreover, cohabiting couples who are separating can make
arrangements in the shadow of the law, ones that serve the interests of the child
even when those interests may conflict with the parents' own preferences.
Finally, procedures should be designed to ensure that the voice of the child,
if old enough, will be heard during the process of making decisions on these
issues. None of this will be possible, however, unless U.S. law gives up its
stubborn adherence to the principle that a child cannot have more than two
parents.

